Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.